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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

Solicitor-general Frierson, in arguing before the supreme court in the
cases of Brewster versus Walsh and Goodrich versus Edwards, laid down
rules for determining gains or losses on sales of property acquired prior to
March 1, 1913, as follows:

(a) There is a taxable profit only when the selling price is greater
than cost.
(b) When value on March 1, 1913, is greater than cost, the taxable
profit is the difference between such value and the selling profit.
(c) If value on March 1, 1913, is less than cost, the taxable profit is
the difference between cost and selling price.
(d) There is a deductible loss only when the selling price is less than
cost:
(1) If value on March 1, 1913, is greater than the cost the deduct
ible loss is the difference between such value and the selling
price;
(2) If value on March 1, 1913, is less than cost, the deductible loss
is the difference between cost and selling price.
The department has not made a ruling as yet in conformity with the
above rules, and they cannot, therefore, be accepted as final, but these rules
are so sensible that it seems probable that the department will not hesitate
to adopt them.
It will be remembered that in the Brewster case one of the premises
cited before the court was that the complainant had purchased certain stock
prior to March 1, 1913, and sold it subsequent thereto at the same price at
which it had been purchased; but, as the value on March 1, 1913, was less
than cost, the department of internal revenue had claimed there was a
taxable profit of the difference between the selling price and the value on
March 1, 1913.
Treasury decision 3125 contains a finding of the United States circuit
court of appeals for the sixth circuit which has important bearing on the
question of depreciation.
There were no other treasury decisions of any general interest during
the month elapsed before going to press, but there were several instructive
office decisions which are set forth below.

TREASURY RULING
(T. D. 3125, February 2, 1921)
Corporation excise tax—Deduction—Depreciation—Decision in court.
1. Deduction—Depreciation—Loss in value of roadbed of railroad.
No deduction for depreciation in value of the roadway of a railroad
may be taken where, because of repairs, renewals, and replacements, the
roadway as a whole is as valuable at the end of the taxable year as at
the beginning.
2. Deductions—Depreciation.
The depreciation which may be deducted in determining net income
is the decrease in intrinsic value due to wear and tear, decay, obso
lescence, etc., of the physical property suffered during the taxable year
as distinguished from the market value.
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3. Deduction—Depreciation—Loss

in value of separate units—Ap
preciation OF OTHER UNITS.

The roadway must be considered as a whole in determining whether
depreciation has been sustained, and the loss in value of separate units
of the roadway may be offset by appreciation in other units.
4. Evidence—Sufficiency of repairs, renewals, and replacements to
OFFSET DEPRECIATION.

There was sufficient evidence that the repairs, renewals, and replace
ments made offset any loss in value, and the roadway had not decreased
in value, to justify the trial court in refusing to direct a verdict.
5. Res judicata—Law of the case—Former appeal.
The decision of this court upon points raised on the former appeal
(249 Fed., 678; T. D. 2697) is adhered to.
The appended decision of the United States circuit court of appeals for
the sixth circuit, in the case of Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway
Co. v. United States, is published for the information of internal revenue
officers and others concerned.
United States circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit.
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co., plaintiff in error, v.
United States, defendant in error.
[December 7, 1920.]
Before Knappen, Denison and Donahue, circuit judges.
Knappen, circuit judge: This case is before this court a second time.
In substance it is this: In June, 1916, the United States, under the direc
tion of its commissioner of internal revenue, brought suit to recover from
defendant an excise tax of 1 per cent. claimed to be due from it for each
of the years 1909 and 1910, under section 38 of the revenue act of August 5,
1909 (36 Stat., 11, 112, ch. 6), which makes every corporation to which it
applies “subject to pay annually” a special excise tax of 1 per cent. on its
net income, to be determined by deducting from gross income, among
other things, operating expenses, losses sustained, “including a reasonable
allowance for depreciation of property,” interest on indebtedness, and
taxes. The declaration alleged the filing by defendant with the commis
sioner of internal revenue, on February 25, 1910, and February 21, 1911,
respectively, of returns of its net income for the respective years 1909 and
1910; that both returns were incorrect as to the amount of defendant’s
income, that for 1909, in that it included, as an item of deduction from
gross income, an alleged charge of $26,000 to expenses, which was not
a necessary expense actually paid out of income in the maintenance and
operation of its business and properties; those for both years, in that they
included charges to depreciation of roadway amounting to $249,024.54 for
the year 1909 and $239,229.70 for the year 1910, which were not charged
against the capital valuation of the roadway on its books and were not
reasonable allowances for depreciation of roadway within the meaning of
the act; that the three items named were disallowed by the commissioner of
internal revenue and held by him to be incorrectly charged; and that they
were in fact not correct and proper deductions from gross income, and
that the total amounts so deducted, which should have been included as
net income in said returns, were for the year 1909 $275,024.54 and for 1910
$239,229.70; that the defendant was thus indebted to the United States
and subject to pay income tax of 1 per cent. upon the amounts stated;
that it had failed and refused to make payment and that the alleged taxes
were thus due from defendant and payable by it to the United States.
The railway company demurred to the declaration upon grounds, so
far as now important (a) that the government could not recover an excise
tax in advance of an assessment by the commissioner of internal revenue,
and (b) that the railway company, having made its returns and paid the
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assessments made by the commissioner, could be made subject to no further
obligation unless the commissioner should discover some item to be false
within three years from March 1 of the year succeeding the calendar year
for which the return is made. The trial court sustained the demurrer.
This court reversed that action, and remanded the case for further pro
ceedings and trial (249 Fed., 678). The railway company then pleaded
nil debet to each of the two counts of the declaration, together with special
pleas to each count, raising the identical questions which had before been
presented by its demurrer to the government’s declaration. The govern
ment’s demurrers to these special pleas were sustained by the district court,
on the authority of this court’s decision. Upon trial by jury there were
verdict and judgment against the railway company for $5,142.50, being
1 per cent. upon the amount of the three items in question. This writ is to
review that judgment.
1. Upon the present hearing counsel for the railway company in sup
port of its special pleas, overruled below, has again argued at great length
the questions presented to and considered by this court under defendant’s
demurrer to the government’s declaration. All of these questions, which
relate equally to the special pleas, were, upon careful consideration, decided
by this court against defendant’s contention. It is unnecessary here to
repeat the grounds of that decision, which sufficiently appear from our
published opinion (249 Fed., 678). The argument now advanced sheds
no additional light upon the subject. We content ourselves with saying
that we find no reason to depart from our former conclusions. The assign
ments of errors numbered 1 to 5, inclusive, are accordingly overruled.
2. The remaining assignments relate to the refusal to direct verdict for
defendant, to the charge as given, and to the refusal of certain of de
fendant’s requested instructions. A consideration of the criticisms relating
to the charge will aid in determining whether there was a case for the jury.
Defendant conceded on the trial that the deduction of the $26,000 item
in its return for 1909 was not authorized. The court accordingly properly
instructed that the government was entitled to a verdict for at least $260.00
on this account. The substance of the charge otherwise was that the
question of fact to be determined was merely whether the deductions made
by defendant in its excise tax reports for the years 1909 and 1910, viz,
$249,024.54 for the former year, and $239,229.70 for the latter year, were
in whole or in part reasonable allowances for depreciation of roadway during
those respective years; that if such allowances were reasonable the govern
ment is not entitled to recover; that if they were not reasonable the gov
ernment was entitled to verdict for 1 per cent. of the amounts improperly
deducted. The jury was specifically instructed to consider, first, “the
depreciation, either physical or functional, in the value of those parts of
the roadway which have not been repaired or renewed or replaced,” and,
second, “what has been the effect of the repairs, renewals and replacements
that have been made to other parts, and determine whether, after you strike
a final balance at the end of the year, the roadway is of greater or less
value, or of equal value, than or to that which it was at the beginning of
the year;” and that if it should be found “that the value of the roadway,
its actual value, is as great at the end of the year, after these repairs and
replacements have been made for which credit has been given as an ex
pense deduction, then there is no depreciation in value of * * * the
roadway, within the meaning of the statute;” but that “if after making
such repairs, replacements and renewals in the different units of the road
way it should be found that some parts have been made more valuable by
the putting in of new parts in place of worn-out parts, yet the depreciation
in the rest of the roadway, in the deterioration, obsolescence, etc., of other
units which have not been changed, and so little done in repairing and
replacing that at the end of the year, taking it as a whole, the depreciation
in value has exceeded the repairs, replacements and renewals, so that it is
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worth less than it was * * * to that extent the railway is entitled to
a deduction of 1 per cent.”
The first specific criticism to the charge is that depreciation was made
to depend upon the relative value of the roadway “in dollars and cents”
at the beginning and end of the respective years. The contention is that
the criterion is “earning power,” “value for use,” not its value to an in
vestor. In point of fact, the court did not use the expression “dollars
and cents” in its charge to the jury. Its various expressions were “value,”
“net value,” “actual value,” “real value,” doubtless meaning intrinsic value,
value in “dollars and cents” as distinguished from market value, which
defendant’s testimony showed might be affected by considerations other
than intrinsic value.
The criticism is without merit. Not only is it clear that market value
was not meant, but the criticism loses all point through the specific ad
mission of defendant’s counsel made upon the trial, that “the road as a
whole, for the purpose of carrying on the business of a common carrier,
was just as valuable at the end of the year as at the beginning,” and by
the equally express admission of defendant’s chief engineer, not only to
the same effect as that of counsel, but, further, that it would be worth
as much to “any persons that wanted to buy it for a railroad.”
The further criticism is made that “the court refused to permit the jury
to consider depreciation, physical or functional, in the units constituting
roadway, track, and structures,” the argument being that “a railroad is a
composite property, it is impossible to figure depreciation of a road as a
whole without first considering depreciation of the units.”
The court, however, did not instruct that depreciation of units could
not be considered in determining the ultimate question whether there was
not depreciation in the roadway as a whole. It is true that after stating
that there would be no depreciation if repairs, renewals, and replacements
had placed the roadway in the. same value as at the beginning of the year,
it was said: “In that sense you should not consider each of the individual
units that enter into the roadway.” But the meaning of that statement
was made clear by the paragraph immediately following: “It was not
intended to have a system of bookkeeping with reference to each particular
crosstie or each particular rail, but you should look to the value of the
roadway as a whole, comparing its value at the beginning of the year with
its value at the end of the year.” Further evidence of the meaning of the
charge appears from the later use of the term “net value;” also by the
earlier reference to the making of repairs, renewals, and replacements in
the roadway by “taking out units that had decayed or whose usefulness
was at an end and putting in others; taking out crossties, decayed crossties,
worthless crossties and putting in new crossties, taking out rails worn out
and putting in new rails; repairing and replacing different units in its
roadway system from time to time;” as well as by the instruction that the
jury should consider “depreciation, either physical or functional, in the
value of those parts of the roadway which- have not been repaired or
renewed or replaced, then also consider what has been the effect of the
repairs, renewals, and replacements that have been made to other parts,
and determine whether after you strike a final balance at the end of the
year the roadway is of greater or less value, or of equal value, than or to
that which it was at the beginning of the year.”
The contention on which defendant seems to rest its chief criticism
seems to be that notwithstanding the roadway as a whole was intrinsically
just as valuable at the end of the year as at the beginning of the year, that
is to say, although depreciation in given units had been fully overcome
by appreciation in others, the railway company would still be entitled to
credit for depreciation in such individual units as had depreciated. We
think this contention of defendant not sustained by reason or authority,
and that the court correctly charged the true criterion. If, as is not entirely
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clear, it is meant to further suggest that the consideration of functional
(as distinguished from physical) depreciation was not allowed by the
charge to be taken into account, the suggestion is plainly without merit.
Not only did the court define the roadway as including “structures con
nected with the roadway, such as stations, tool houses and matters of that
sort,” but it included in depreciation a lessening of original value “due to
wear and tear, decay, gradual decline from obsolescence, that is, getting
out of date, and inadequacy.” In our opinion the jury was given the
correct rule for determining the existence or nonexistence of depreciation,
which accords with the “ordinary and usual sense” of that term “as under
stood by business men.”—Van Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co. (242 U. S.,
503, 524). To say that property can depreciate without impairment of
either intrinsic value or efficiency is to our minds a solecism.
3. The refusal to direct verdict.—The sole question in this regard is
whether or not there was substantial testimony tending to support the gov
ernment’s contention that there was during the years 1909 and 1910 no net
depreciation in the intrinsic value of the roadway and structures con
sidered as a unit. It is not highly important to the determination of this
question whether the controversy arose on one theory and was tried on
another, nor whether the claimed depreciation would have been allowed
under the system of bookkeeping employed by the government had the
charges therefor been set up on the railway company’s books (249 Fed.,
686).
It appears that defendant arrived at the depreciation charges by estimat
ing the value of the perishable structures as one-third the cost of the road
(less equipment and real estate), and then taking 3 per cent. of this onethird value, on the theory that the average life of the various perishable
elements was 33⅓ years. Whether or not these depreciation estimates
were reasonable was a question for the jury.
In our opinion there was substantial testimony tending to support the
government’s contention. It appeared that there was expended in round
numbers for maintenance of way and structures; that is to say, for repairs,
renewals, and replacements for the year 1909, $1,600,000, and for the year
1910, $1,554,000, and that no substantial part of these sums was carried in
defendant’s accounting as additions and betterments. It was admitted by
defendant’s chief engineer that the expenditures for 1909 “kept the road
in normal condition to carry on its business,” that “its normal condition
was a good condition,” and that the expenditures “had made good the
normal amount of depreciation.” There was testimony by competent wit
nesses of railway experience that “there may be depreciation in the units
comprising the roadway, track, and structures of the railroad, while there
is no depreciation in the machine as a whole;” also that it is possible “to
maintain the roadway, track, and structures so that there will be no de
preciation if we consider the roadway, track, and structures as a composite
whole;” also that “the service life of any normally operated and normally
and well maintained railroad is perpetual, and it is maintained in the con
dition of property serving its purpose by annual renewals and replace
ments.” The testimony, considered as a whole, tended to support the con
clusion that the amounts expended by defendant during the years in
question for repairs, renewals, and replacements should and would have
fully offset the depreciation in the various units, and that the defendant’s
railway and structures were, as a whole, maintained throughout the years
in question in fully as good condition, and were of fully as great intrinsic
value, as at the beginning of the respective years. The jury would have
been clearly justified in inferring from the testimony of defendant’s chief
engineer, taken as a whole, that the value of the roadway had not de
preciated during the two years in question; in other words, that the repairs
and renewals that had been made were of such a character as to leave the
road at the end of each year of value equal to that at the beginning of the
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year. That officer’s testimony so impressed the trial judge, who stated his
opinion from the evidence that “there is no reasonable deduction for de
preciation established.” Defendant did not directly controvert the situation
so shown. Its chief, if not its only, reliance seems to have been on the
proposition that in spite of it all there was inevitable annual depreciation
in some of the perishable elements not entirely renewed or replaced, so
justifying the contention that for this reason there was depreciation within
the meaning of the act, even though the roadway as a whole had not
decreased in value. To this argument, as already said, we can not assent.
It follows that the trial judge rightfully refused to instruct verdict for
defendant.
OFFICE DECISIONS
Section 212, article 22: Computation of net income.
O. D. 803
The following rates have been accepted by the bureau of internal revenue
as the current or market rates of exchange prevailing as of December 31,
1920:
London ........................... 3.535 (dollars to £ sterling).
Australia ................. 3.55
(dollars to £ sterling).
New Zealand .......... 3.55
(dollars to £ sterling).
Paris ................................... 0590 (cents to franc).
Belgium ............................... 0622 (cents to franc).
Milan ................................... 0347 (cents to lira).
Zurich ................................. 1528 (cents to franc).
Madrid ................................ 1355 (cents to peseta).
Stockholm ........................... 20
(cents to krone).
Christiania .......................... 1535 (cents to krone).
Copenhagen .........................1535 (cents to krone).
Amsterdam ......................... 3145 (cents to guilder).
Buenos Aires ...................... 7510 (cents to peso).
Montevideo .........................7462 (cents to centavo).
Colombia:
Bogota ..........................8620 (Colombian cents to dollars).
Barranquila ................. 8474 (Colombian cents to dollars).
Cartagena ..................... 8474 (Colombian cents to dollars).
Medellin ....................... 8474 (Colombian cents to dollars).
Lima .............................. 4.42
(dollars to Peruvian £).
Bolivia .................................277 (cents to bolivianos).
Mexico City........................ 4925 (cents to peso).
Yokohama .......................... 48
(cents to yen).
Calcutta ............................... 265 (cents to rupee).
Singapore ............................ 42
(cents to Singapore dollars).
Dutch E. Indies..................3145 (cents to florin).
Germany .............................. 01365 (cents to mark).
Poland................................. 0016 (cents to mark).
Austria ................................ 0024 (cents to krone).
Czecho-Slovakia................. 0115 (cents to krone).
Jugo-Slavia ........................ 007 (cents to krone).
Greece ................................. 074 (cents to drachma).
Roumania ............................ 0126 (cents to leu).
Bulgaria ............................... 0115 (cents to lev).
Serbia ................................. 0274 (cents to dinar).
Finland ................................ 032 (cents to markka).
Canada ................................ 86
(cents to Canadian dollar).
Section 214(a) 1, article 101: Business expenses.
O. D. 805
(Also section 215, article 293.)
In addition to his salary as an employee, a taxpayer receives sundry
amounts from various periodicals for articles contributed by him. His
activities in this respect are sufficiently frequent to constitute his writing a
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business. Held, that the expenses incurred for information services, mag
azines, stationery, and supplies used in connection with the production of
the articles referred to may be deducted as a business expense, but the cost
of books is held to be a capital expense and as such not deductible. There
may be taken as a deduction an amount representing depreciation on books,
typewriter, furniture, and other equipment of a permanent character in
proportion to their use in connection with the production of such articles,
providing, however, that no other deduction in respect thereof has been or
is being claimed in a return.
In accordance with article 292 of regulations 45, as amended by treasury
decision 3101, it is held that when trips are made for the express purpose
of securing facts for an article, there may be deducted from gross income
the reasonable and necessary traveling expenses, including railroad fares,
as well as expenses for meals and lodging in an amount in excess of any
expenditures ordinarily required for such purposes when at home.
Section 219, article 343: Decedent’s estate during
O. D. 807
administration.
In February, 1919, A contracted for the sale of certain land receiving x
dollars in cash, the balance of 11x dollars to be paid in April, 1919.
A died before April, 1919, and the contract was not completed until
August or September of that year, when the deed was passed and possession
taken by the purchaser. The question arises as to whether any gain was
realized either by A or by his estate.
Since the x dollars received by A prior to his death was mere earnest
money to bind the contract, he did not receive taxable income from the
transaction, inasmuch as the contract was not consummated during his life.
No taxable gain was realized by the estate because of the transaction.
Although the legal title to the land vested in the executor for purposes of
administration, the substantial thing that went to the executor was the
right under the contract to the unpaid balance of the purchase price in trust
for the devisees. It is the value of this right of contract and not the value
of the land that should be considered. The basis for determining the gain
or loss upon the sale or conversion of property acquired by bequest, devise,
or descent, is the value of the property at the death of the testator, or its
value as at March 1, 1913, if acquired prior thereto. As the right or con
tract was in this case valued for federal estate tax purposes for 11x dollars,
which was the amount received by the estate, there could be no gain or loss
to the estate. (O. D. 631; 33-20-1134 modified.)

Section 219, article 347: Estates and trusts
O. D. 808
which can not be treated as a unit.
Under a will a trust was created for the period of A’s life, a part of the
income of which is to be paid to a charitable institution and an educational
institution and the remainder to A. At the termination of the trust the
property is bequeathed to the charitable and educational institutions. A
portion of the trust property was shares of stock. In 1919, the right was
given to shareholders to subscribe to additional shares of this stock which
right was sold by the trustee.
Held, that the amount received by the trustee from the sale of the right
is taxable income, the imposition of the tax not being affected by the fact
that the ultimate beneficiaries may be a charitable and an educational in
stitution.
Held further, that the trust can not be treated as a unit for income tax
purposes, there being income distributable periodically and also income (ac
cording to federal income tax statutes and regulations) which is not dis
tributable periodically under the law of the state in which the testator re
sided. The amount received from the sale of the right to subscribe for
stock is income according to federal income-tax statutes, and under the state
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law the profit from the sale of the right goes to the remainderman as against
the life tenant.
The trustee should file form 1040 returning as income the amount re
ceived from the sale of the right which is not distributable periodically and
also form 1041 showing the distributive shares of the beneficiaries in that
portion of the trust income which is distributable periodically.
Section 326, article 836: Tangible property paid in;
O. D. 813
value in excess of par value of stock.
The M Company was organized subsequent to 1919. Soon thereafter it
acquired all the capital stock of the N Company by issuing to the stock
holders of the N Company its own stock in an amount equal to the par
value of their shares of stock. The M Company thereupon by merger
absorbed the N Company and became the owner of all the property of
the N Company, which consisted of real estate, buildings, machinery and
equipment, stock on hand, and work in process. This property had been
purchased by the N Company in the same year at a bargain, as shown by
an appraisal made of the property about the time it was taken over by the
M Company.
Held, that the company could not include in its invested capital as
paid-in surplus the excess of the value of the property over the purchase
price paid therefor. Any excess resulted from a successful bargain and is
not paid-in surplus. Paid-in surplus as used in section 326 of the revenue
act of 1918 does not mean the excess value of property purchased in a bona
fide sale over the purchase price thereof. To constitute paid-in surplus of
a corporation there must, in effect, be a gift to the corporation.
Section 212, article 25: Accounting period.
A. R. R. 391
The committee has had under consideration the appeal of the M Com
pany from the action of the income-tax unit holding that the corporation is
liable to file income and profits tax returns on the basis of fiscal years end
ing October 31, 1918, and 1919, instead of upon the calendar year basis.
It appears from the records in the case that the M Company was or
ganized in July, 1917, as the successor to a corporation of the same name
whose fiscal year ended on October 31 of each year. The new corporation
adopted such fiscal year as its own and took exact inventories and closed
its books on October 31 of each year, which inventories were carried for
ward as a running book inventory so that figures were available as of the
first of each month.
The M Company now states:
The new corporation on its organization did not request the permis
sion of the department to file upon a fiscal year, and accordingly returns
were filed for 1917 and 1918 upon the basis of a calendar year. In pre
paring the return for the calendar year 1919, however, the company se
cured the assistance of a firm of accountants who advised them that
under the act of 1918 the return should be filed upon a fiscal year, and
at their suggestion a letter (dated April 15, 1920) was prepared and sent
to the department requesting permission to file for a fiscal year ending
October 31. This permission was granted, and accordingly an amended
return for the year ending October 31, 1928, was prepared and filed, and
a return for the year ending October 31, 1919, was filed.
The company now contends that the accountants were in error in advis
ing it to file returns on the basis of a fiscal year ending October 31; that
its original returns were properly filed on the calendar year basis and should
be accepted. The corporation frankly states that during November and
December of 1918 it suffered a large loss, that during the first 10 months of
1919 it made very large profits, and if its tax is to be determined on the
basis of a fiscal year ending October 31 a peculiar hardship to the company
will result.
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The records further show that in July, 1919 the corporation adopted a
new set of by-laws which included the following:
Article X. Fiscal year.—The fiscal year of the corporation shall
begin on January first and end on December thirty-first in each year.
This case is similar to that covered by committee recommendation 342
except that in the latter the taxpayer changed its accounting period from a
fiscal year to calendar year basis prior to the passage of the revenue act of
1918, and closed its books on the latter basis. As has been shown, the M
Company did not make such change until July, 1919, subsequent to the
passage of the said act.
What was stated in recommendation 342 relative to returns filed on a
calendar year basis for years prior to 1918 applies with equal force to the
return filed on a calendar year basis for the year 1917 by the M Company.
Since, however, that company did not change its accounting period prior to
the passage of the revenue act of 1918, and did not formally close its books
as of December 31, 1918, it did not fix an annual accounting period on the
basis of a calendar year in accordance with the requirements of article 25,
regulations 45. As stated in that article:
A taxpayer having an existing accounting period which is a fiscal
year within the meaning of the statute not only needs no permission to
make his return on the basis of such a taxable year, but is required to
do so, regardless of the former basis of rendering returns.
From date of organization up to July, 1919, the fiscal year of the M
Company is established by its by-laws closed on October 31 of each year,
exact inventories were taken, and the company’s books were formally closed
as of that date. No request for permission to change from a fiscal year to
a calendar year basis was made by the corporation prior to July 6, 1920,
and therefore the committee recommends that the original return filed by
the company on a calendar year basis for 1917 be accepted, and that returns
to cover the period subsequent to December 31, 1917, be accepted only when
filed on the basis of fiscal years ended October 31.
Section 213(a), article 48: Improvements by lessees
M. 2714
(Also section 214(a) 1, article 109.)
(Also section 214(a) 8, article 164.)
INCOME to lessor from improvements erected by the lessee upon
LEASED GROUND.

Treasury decision 3062, dated September 1, 1920, dealing with the ques
tion of the realization of income by a lessor from the erection by the lessee
of improvements on leased ground, has been the subject of many inquiries.
It is deemed advisable, therefore, to state the reasons for its promulga
tion and to demonstrate the proper construction of it by application to a
specific case.
On February 6, 1917, by treasury decision 2442, the bureau held that
where, under the terms of a rental or lease contract, a tenant agrees to
erect a building or other permanent improvement, upon the freehold of
another, the building or improvements become a part of the realty, and
the difference between the cost of the improvements and the allowable de
preciation during the lease term is gain or profit to the lessor at the end of
the lease term and is to be accounted for as income at that time.
The ruling contained in treasury decision 2442 was adhered to by the
bureau and was embodied, with some minor changes, in regulations 33,
revised, article 4, paragraph 50, and in regulations 45, article 48. The
bureau abandoned this ruling only when forced to do so by the courts. In
the case of Miller v. Gearin, 258 Fed. 225, the circuit court of appeals for
the ninth circuit held that the value of improvements erected upon leased
ground by a lessee is not income to the lessor at the expiration of the term
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of the lease. A writ of certiorari was sought from the supreme court but
was denied. Following this decision came the case of Cryan v. Wardell,
263 Fed. 248, reaching the same conclusion. In both of these decisions it
is held that the value of improvements erected on leased ground by a
lessee is not income of the lessor at the termination of the period of the
lease, and it is stated, obiter dictum, that the income, if any, is realized
when the buildings or improvements are erected and title passes to the lessor.
In Miller v. Gearin, supra, the court said:
The lessor acquired nothing in 1916 (the year of the termination of
the lease) save the possession of that which for many years had been
her own. It was not a gain but a loss. Assuming that the building was
income derived from the use of the property we think it clear that the
time when it was “derived” was the time when the completed building
was added to the real estate and enhanced its value.
And in Cryan v. Wardell, supra, it is stated:
The right to levy the tax turns upon the question: When did title
to this building vest in plaintiff and become a part of her property for the
purpose of taxation? I am of opinion that under well-settled principles,
aptly expressed in section 1013, civil code of California, the moment the
building was erected, which the terms of the lease show was to become
and remain an integral portion of the land upon which it was constructed,
the title thereto vested as completely in plaintiff as though constructed
by the plaintiff herself. * * *. It, therefore, became, upon the com
pletion, a part and parcel of plaintiff’s income-bearing property, and was
subject to taxation in her as of that date.
As a result of these decisions, the office modified its prior rulings on the
subject, and T. D. 3062 was accordingly promulgated.
The adoption in T. D. 3062 of the view occasioned by the above-cited
decisions, that the value of improvements erected on leased ground by the
lessee is income to the lessor upon the passage of title, raised the further
question as to the measure of the income to be returned by the lessor.
Although the lessor has acquired title to the improvements upon their
erection by the lessee, yet it is obvious that the lessor has not received their
full value, as measured by an unrestricted dominion over them, inasmuch
as his proprietorship is subject to the exclusive right of the lessee to their
possession and use during the term of the lease. In recognition of this
point it is held in T. D. 3062, that the lessor must include in gross income
for the year in which title passes the depreciated value of the improvements
—that is, he includes in gross income the estimated present value to him of
the improvements, the possession and enjoyment of which is postponed
until the termination of the period of the lease. To compute this depre
ciated value, the value of the land free from the lease without the improve
ments is subtracted from the value of the land subject to the lease and
with the improvements. Inasmuch as the lessor has included in income
only the depreciated value of the improvements, in effect taking his depre
ciation deductions in advance, he is entitled to no depreciation deduction
with respect to such improvements until the expiration of the term of the
lease when he gains the possession.
The following example is given to illustrate the proper construction to
be given to T. D. 3062:
A, in 1915, leases certain land to B for 20 years. B agrees, in part con
sideration for the lease, to erect on the leased ground a building, specifica
tions agreed upon, of an estimated life of 25 years and to cost $50,000,
which building is not to be subject to removal by B. The building is com
pleted in 1920.
A realizes income in 1920, the year in which title to the building passes.
The measure of the income is the present value to A of the building, of
an estimated life of 25 years and cost of $50,000, the use and enjoyment of
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which is postponed for 15 years. The depreciated value of the building at
the termination of the period of the lease will be approximately $20,000—
that is, cost less depreciation sustained. The income of A, then, is the
discounted value of $20,000 receivable at the end of 15 years. If market
value reflects intrinsic value, this amount should equal the difference be
tween the value of the land free from the lease without the buildings and
the value of the land subject to the lease with the building. However, any
other evidence available should be considered in determining this present
worth to the taxpayer of the legal title to the encumbered building. Since
A has included in income only the depreciated value of the building, he is
entitled to a depreciation deduction with respect to such building only for
the years after the termination of the period of the lease when A has come
into possession. This depreciation deduction to which A is entitled for
1935 and subsequent years should be computed on a basis of the estimated
remaining life of the building and a “cost” value equal to the market value
placed on the encumbered building by A in the year of its erection, i. e., the
annual depreciation deduction for 1935 and subsequent years will be the
quotient obtained by dividing (a) the value of the improvements to A as
determined by him when the same completed became part of the realty,
by (b) the number of years in the estimated remaining life of the improve
ments from the termination of the lease.
In any case in which the term of the lease is greater than the estimated
life of the improvement no income should be accounted for by the lessor
at the time of the passage of title. Also if the improvements will have
no value at the termination of the lease, as is often the case in mining
leases, no income is realized by the lessor.
Section 214(a) 8, article 163: Depreciation
O. D. 818
of intangible property.
In the case of liquor dealers the useful life of whose intangibles such
as good will, trade-marks and trade brands, was definitely limited as a
result of prohibition legislation, an allowance for obsolescence is permis
sible. However, in the case of dealers who continued in a similar trade
or business, the useful life of such intangibles is not definitely limited,
although the profits may have been reduced. Therefore, liquor dealers
who continued in a similar trade or business can not obtain a deduction
under section 214(a) 8 on account of obsolescence of their good will, trade
marks and trade brands.
Section 326, article 841: Surplus and undivided
A. R. R. 394
profits: limitation of additions to surplus account.
Recommended that a corporation which issued bonds at a discount
in January, 1900, and elected then to charge such discount to profit and
loss for the year of issue and the next two succeeding years, may not
now revise its accounts and file amended returns for the purpose of re
instating to invested capital the unexpired portion of such discount and
claiming as a deduction from income that portion applicable to each
year.
It appears from the records that the M Company issued bonds on
January 1, 1900, to the amount of 70x dollars at a discount of 7x dollars
and charged such discount to profit and loss in 1900, 1901, and 1902.
The accountants writing in behalf of the corporation stated that it was
their understanding that for the purpose of computing net income the case
was covered by article 544(3) (a) of regulations 45. The M Company
in its appeal contends, in effect, that it did not follow good accounting
practice in charging off the discount in question to profit and loss during
the years 1900, 1901, and 1902; that recognized accounting authorities,
some of whom are named and quoted, hold that discount on bonds issued
should be spread over the term of the bonds and the installments thereof
charged against income each year, and that, under article 544, it did not
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have an option of treating all of such discount as interest expense at the
date of issuance of the bonds.
Article 544(3) (a) of regulations 45, reads:
If bonds are issued by a corporation at a discount, the net amount
of such discount is deductible as interest and should be prorated or
amortized over the life of the bonds.
The unit, in its reply of June 30, 1920, contended that article 544(3) (a)
must be considered in connection with article 841, which latter article, bear
ing the caption “Surplus and undivided profits: limitation of additions to
surplus account,” provides, in part, that deductions which have been taken
from income and which are as a matter of good accounting to some extent
optional, such as experimental expenses, patent litigation, development of
good will through advertising or otherwise, can not be reinstated in surplus,
as in such cases it is considered that the corporation has exercised a bind
ing option in deducting such expenses from income, and an election of
this sort which was made concurrently with the transaction can not now
be revised and amended returns in respect thereto can not be accepted.
The solicitor of internal revenue, in a memorandum dated May 13, 1919,
commenting on a ruling in a case similar to the one under consideration,
stated:
It appears that the corporation in this case had an option as to the
method it would adopt in handling entries of the discount on the bonds
which it issued. Two methods were available:
First. To treat the discount as interest paid in advance to be amor
tized over the life of the bonds.
Second. To charge the discount as a loss in its profit and loss account.
The corporation exercised its option by adopting the second method.
It did so apparently to lessen its income for the year the transaction
took place. It now seeks to adopt the first method and desires to amend
its 1917 return accordingly. The effect of this procedure would be that
the discount item would be taken from the losses (profit and loss ac
count), thus diminishing the losses and thereby increasing its surplus
account, and indirectly its invested capital.
Where a corporation has exercised an option as to accounting prac
tice and such option was concurrent with the transaction, amended re
turns are not permissible. See article 841 of regulations 45.
While the committee is in accord with the contention of the M Com
pany that it did not follow the more generally approved accounting method
in charging off the discount on its bonds of January 1, 1900, as it did, that
fact alone does not entitle it now to adopt another method and adjust its
accounts for the purpose of filing amended income and profits tax returns.
There were at the time said bonds were issued no income-tax regulations
prescribing a method to be followed in the treatment of bond discount. It
was entirely optional with the taxpayer as to the method it would adopt in
handling entries of discount on bonds issued, and inasmuch as that option
was exercised at the time the bonds were issued a different method of
accounting can not now, in the opinion of the committee, be adopted for
tax purposes, which opinion is sustained by the decision in the case of the
C. & A. Railroad v. United States Court of Claims (see article 149, regu
lations 33, revised, issued under the provisions of the revenue act of 1916,
as amended by the revenue act of 1917).
The committee, therefore, recommends that the ruling of the unit be
sustained.
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